



SECTION #11

U.S. WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

“Damming” Afghanistan

Calluther 2002

- What influenced U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the Cold War?
{Consider the case of the Helmand & Arghandab Valley Authority}
- How would you compare this to U.S. involvement in Vietnam?



The New York Times

Building a Dam in a Bid to End Afghan Instability


By Carlotta Gall

Sept. 18, 2007

KAJAKI DAM, Afghanistan — The police posts on the hilltops around Kajaki Dam look out over empty villages and a deserted bazaar, where weeds grow and rubbish blows down the street. The population left a year and a half ago and only a few hundred people remain here, most of them soldiers and police officers guarding Afghanistan's jewel of industry, its largest hydroelectric dam, against Taliban insurgents.



Occupation timelines



Common challenges

Afghanistan & Iraq

- Stakes vs. leverage: the more US demanded local reform, the more leverage the locals had
- “Can’t leave, can’t escalate:” US concerned about the terrorism threat but also lacked domestic support to escalate
- Literal resource trade-off: no surge in Afghanistan w/o drawdown in Iraq
- Force protection vs. population security (e.g., yesterday’s panel)
- Foreign occupation vs. nation-building: can a foreign nation-builder ever be legitimate in the eyes of the occupied?

Lessons Learned (SIGAR)

1. The U.S. government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve.
2. The U.S. government consistently underestimated the amount of time required to rebuild Afghanistan, and created unrealistic timelines and expectations that prioritized spending quickly. These choices increased corruption and reduced the effectiveness of programs.
3. Many of the institutions and infrastructure projects the United States built were not sustainable.
4. Counterproductive civilian and military personnel policies and practices thwarted the effort.
5. Persistent insecurity severely undermined reconstruction efforts.
6. The U.S. government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly.
7. U.S. government agencies rarely conducted sufficient monitoring and evaluation to understand the impact of their efforts.

**How might Cullather and Malkasian assess
the SIGAR report findings?**

Kahoot!