





Section 1: Intro to IR theory

Jigsaw Variation

1. Describe the data
 - Numerical, categorical
 - Horizontal/vertical axis
2. Formulate the “puzzle”
 - e.g., why this and not that





Source: COW nmc data



Source: The Economist (2011)

Theory: Arming

- Why do states arm during some time periods but defer in others?
- Ideal world: no guns/arming
- Situation: no world government to prevent cheating and conquest
 - Arming dilemma: arms give states more power to coerce/deter, but guns come at the cost of “butter” (i.e., domestic welfare)
- Basic theory: Prisoner’s dilemma

Prisoner's dilemma

- Actors: 2 states
- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
- Outcomes: cooperation, arms race, sucker punch, or get sucker punched
- Preferences: sucker punch > cooperation > arms race > get sucker punched

		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass	0 , 0	-2 , 1
	Arm	1 , -2	-1 , -1

Prisoner's dilemma

- Actors: 2 states
- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
- Outcomes: cooperation, arms race, sucker punch, or get sucker punched
- Preferences: sucker punch > cooperation > arms race > get sucker punched

		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass	0 , 0	
	Arm	<u>1</u> , -2	

State A's best response when State B chooses to pass

Prisoner's dilemma

- Actors: 2 states
- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
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		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass		-2 , 1
	Arm		<u>-1</u> , -1

State A's best response when State B chooses to arm

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- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
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- Preferences: sucker punch > cooperation > arms race > get sucker punched

		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass	0 , 0	-2 , 1
	Arm	<u>1</u> , -2	<u>-1</u> , -1

State A's has a dominant strategy.

Prisoner's dilemma

- Actors: 2 states
- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
- Outcomes: cooperation, arms race, sucker punch, or get sucker punched
- Preferences: sucker punch > cooperation > arms race > get sucker punched

		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass	0 , 0	-2 , <u>1</u>
	Arm		

State B's best response when State A chooses to pass.

Prisoner's dilemma

- Actors: 2 states
- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
- Outcomes: cooperation, arms race, sucker punch, or get sucker punched
- Preferences: sucker punch > cooperation > arms race > get sucker punched

		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass		
	Arm	<u>1</u> , -2	<u>-1</u> , <u>-1</u>

State B's best response when State A chooses to arm.

Prisoner's dilemma

- Actors: 2 states
- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
- Outcomes: cooperation, arms race, sucker punch, or get sucker punched
- Preferences: sucker punch > cooperation > arms race > get sucker punched

		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass	0 , 0	-2 , <u>1</u>
	Arm	<u>1</u> , -2	-1 , <u>-1</u>

There exists a Nash equilibrium.

Prisoner's dilemma

- Actors: 2 states
- Simultaneous choice: pass (cooperate) or arm (defect)
- Outcomes: cooperation, arms race, sucker punch, or get sucker punched
- Preferences: sucker punch > cooperation > arms race > get sucker punched

		State B	
		Pass	Arm
State A	Pass	0 , 0	-2 , <u>1</u>
	Arm	<u>1</u> , -2	<u>-1</u> , <u>-1</u>

Problem: always predicts an arms race!

Theory: Revolutions

- Why do revolutions occur in some autocratic states but not others?
- Situation: need strength in numbers to depose an autocrat, but people don't know one another's preferences
 - Status quo bias: if too few people turn out, the autocrat can more readily punish them
- Theory: Stag hunt

Stag hunt

- Actors: 2 citizens
- Choices: protest (cooperate) or stay loyal (defect)
- Outcomes: revolution, status quo, other citizen gets jailed, you go to jail
- Preferences: protest > other citizen to jail > status quo > get sent to jail

		Citizen B	
		Protest	Loyalty
Citizen A	Protest		
	Loyalty		

Stag hunt

- Actors: 2 citizens
- Choices: protest (cooperate) or stay loyal (defect)
- Outcomes: revolution, status quo, other citizen gets jailed, you go to jail
- Preferences: protest > other citizen to jail > status quo > get sent to jail

		Citizen B	
		Protest	Loyalty
Citizen A	Protest	<u>1</u> , <u>1</u>	-1 , 0
	Loyalty	0 , -1	<u>0</u> , <u>0</u>

There exist two Nash equilibria.

Deriving predictions

- One prediction from stag hunt theory of revolution:
 - As more **information** about other citizen's preferences becomes available, more likely to observe the revolution outcome.
- Testable hypothesis:
 - As the **digital connectivity** of citizens increase, the probability of individual participation in mass protests increase.

Research design discussion

- As the **digital connectivity** of citizens increase, the probability of individual participation in mass protests increase.

1. What are the dependent and independent variables in this case?
2. What is the unit of observation, and from where do we draw our sample?
3. What kind of data would you use to test the hypothesis, and why?

Papers testing this and related hypotheses:

Enikolopov, Makarin, and Petrova, Social media and protest participation: Evidence from Russia, *Econometrica* (2020)
Manacorda and Tesei, Liberation technology: Mobile phones and political mobilization in Africa, *Econometrica* (2020)

This section was brought to you by Dr. Ralph J. Bunche.



“Peace, to have meaning for many who have known only suffering in both peace and war, must be translated into bread or rice, shelter, health, and education, as well as freedom and human dignity - a steadily better life.” – Dr. Ralph J. Bunche

- American diplomat, who played a major role in formation of the UN and mediated first Arab-Israeli War
- Awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 (first Black American to receive the award)
- PhD in Government and IR from Harvard '34
- Founded the Political Science Department at Howard