



Section 3: Domestic politics



Update: Crisis in Ukraine


- Continued Russian military presence surrounding Ukraine
 - Russia announces pullback —> USA/ NATO dispute this and even suggest there's evidence of greater mobilization
- Cyberattacks against Ukrainian defense ministry and Ukraine's two largest banks
- US intelligence disclosures about possible invasion plans

Will bargaining succeed or fail?




Source: Unity Day (2/16/2022), Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

Regime type: USA and Russia



Data source: VDem v11.1, used LibDem variable with proposed cutoff of $x > 0.6$

Democratic peace?



Data source: V-Dem v 11.1 and COW

Democratic peace theory

Explanation	Monadic	Dyadic
Normative	Norms of peaceful conflict resolution domestically extends to IR	Shared liberal ideology and bonds (distrust of autocracies)
Institutional: Accountability	Since voters pay costs of war, leaders must be more cautious	?
Institutional: Transparency I	Information on resolve and capabilities are more out in the open (e.g., free press, Congressional hearings)	Two to tango?
Institutional: Transparency II	Audience costs improve ability to credibly signal private information	Two to tango?

Application: Regime type

U.S. Intelligence Agencies Face Crucial Test in Deciphering Putin's Motives

Knowing the intention of any autocratic leader is difficult, but Mr. Putin, who began his career as a K.G.B. officer, is a particular challenge. Because he avoids electronic devices, oftentimes bans note-takers, and tells his aides little, there is a limit to how much an intelligence agency can learn about his intentions and thinking.

“We do not understand fundamentally, none of us do, what is inside President Putin’s head, and so we cannot make any guess about where all of this is headed,” Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, told reporters on Tuesday.

One senior official who has met with Russian counterparts in an effort to defuse the current crisis said recently that the U.S. delegation came away with the sense that Mr. Putin’s representatives were taking a hard line because they did not know what their boss wanted to do.


Source: Sanger, Barnes, and Schmitt, NYT, 2/15/2022

1. How does regime type affect bargaining in the Russia-Ukraine crisis?
2. In light of the challenges regime type presents in bargaining, what can be done to avert conflict?

Diversionsary war

- Definition: war which leader launches to achieve “**rally around the flag**”
 - Applies to democracies and autocracies
- Condition under which rally effect could lead to war per bargaining model:
 - Rally effect > aggregate war costs

Is such a rally
effect size
realistic?



This section was brought to you by the (actual) NSC Principals.

