




Section 9: International institutions



Source: Institute for the Study of War (21:00 GMT, 12 April)

Updates: War in Ukraine

- Day 50 of Russia's war against Ukraine
- > 10 million Ukrainians displaced from their homes
- US increasing arms to Ukraine
- Putin turns attention to the Donbas region
- Mounting evidence of war crimes in Russian offensive

Can international institutions do anything about the war?

International institutions and the war in Ukraine

POSTEVERYTHING • Perspective

Putin won't end up at The Hague — but war-crimes prosecutions of Russia still matter

Three courts are investigating Russia's conduct during its war in Ukraine.

By Kelebogile Zvobgo and Nathaniel Liu

March 15, 2022 at 11:58 a.m. EDT

International Law Goes to War in Ukraine

The Legal Pushback to Russia's Invasion

By [Oona A. Hathaway](#) March 15, 2022

SECURITY COUNCIL
8979TH MEETING (PM)

SC/14808
25 FEBRUARY 2022

Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Ending Ukraine Crisis, as Russian Federation Wields Veto

Micro Debate

International institutions matter vs.
international institutions don't matter

1. Find a partner and choose side
2. 2 rounds of 60 seconds
3. Switch sides —> 2 more rounds
4. Group discussion of highlights



Verbalize: IPD theory of int'l institutions

- Realists: IOs can't enforce anything/only interests of the strong
- Puzzle: If IOs don't matter at all, why do they exist?
- Theory: iterated prisoner's dilemma (IOs are rational!)
 - If 2 states face PD repeatedly over time, states can use **conditional retaliation** (e.g., grim trigger) to induce cooperation
 - Gains of cooperation over time > benefits of one defection
 - IOs institutionalize IPD

Play: IPD

- Every pair is assigned a different institution
 - Specifies conditional strategy
- 5 rounds: choose cooperate or defect
 - CC: (5, 5) ; CD: (-5, 10) pts; DC (10, -5); DD (0, 0)
- Do not communicate with one another ahead of time
- After each round reveal prior action you chose and tabulate score

1. What was your institution?

2. Did it work?

3. Example of your institution in the real world.

Mathematize: Grim Trigger NE

- Game: 2 states play PD across infinite rounds
- Want: **benefits of cooperation** > **benefit of defection | grim trigger**

$$C + \delta C + \delta^2 C + \delta^3 C + \dots \geq T + 0 + 0 + 0 + \dots$$

$$\frac{C}{1-\delta} \geq T$$

$$\delta \geq \frac{T-C}{T}$$

Application: Compliance with IHL

- International humanitarian law: rules about what states can & cannot do during an armed conflict
 - Distinguish between combatants & civilians
 - Prohibit/limit use of particularly cruel weapons (e.g., chemical weapons)
 - Care for wounded/sick & protect medical personnel
 - Dignity of prisoners of war & civilian internees



What explains variation across states in whether they comply with the laws of war?

Score these theories and predictions out of 5

Theory 1: Reciprocity

States prefer complying with IHL when they know the other side will also respect IHL, otherwise there will be asymmetric brutality. Signing onto the Geneva Conventions is an indicator that a state intends to abide by IHL and may face punishment for breaching IHL. The expectation that states will be punished for breaking the treaty deters violations.

Prediction: If both states ratified IHL treaties, then compliance with the rules of war is more likely.

Theory 2: Nationalism

I propose a theory of compliance grounded in domestic politics, in particular nationalism. Nationalist leaders care more about their state than other types of leaders. So, they are more willing to bring down “fire and fury” upon their adversary to show national pride. They also resist international law telling them what to do.

Prediction: An increase in nationalism will lead to a decrease in compliance.

Theory 3: Regime type

I propose a theory of compliance and domestic political institutions. When a state ratifies the Geneva Conventions, it sets expectations about its behavior in the eyes of domestic audiences. In general, democratic political institutions allow domestic audiences to better hold leaders accountable. Thus, democratic states will be held more accountable for its degree of compliance with IHL.

Prediction: A democratic regime will comply with IHL, whereas an autocratic regime will not.

Some considerations

- Is the IV and DV clear? Are they consistent?
- Are there assumptions that require extra explanation?
- Is the prediction probabilistic or deterministic?
- Consider whether reverse causality may be an issue.

This section was brought to you by Kofi Annan (1938-2018).

- 7th Secretary-General of the UN (1997-2006)
- 2001 recipient of Nobel Peace Prize
- Some of his contributions (among many others):
 - Responsibility to protect (R2P)
 - Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB, & Malaria
 - Millennium Development Goals & Africa
 - Timor-Leste's independence
 - Mediated settlement of Cameroon-Nigeria dispute over Bakassi peninsula
 - Transition to civilian rule in Nigeria

